Japanese Rice Protectionism: A Challenge for the Development of Agricultural Trade Laws by Udo, Chandler H
Boston College International and Comparative Law Review
Volume 31 | Issue 1 Article 9
12-1-2008
Japanese Rice Protectionism: A Challenge for the
Development of Agricultural Trade Laws
Chandler H. Udo
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/iclr
Part of the Agriculture Law Commons, and the International Trade Commons
This Notes is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Boston College International and Comparative Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Boston College Law
School. For more information, please contact nick.szydlowski@bc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Chandler H. Udo, Japanese Rice Protectionism: A Challenge for the Development of Agricultural Trade
Laws , 31 B.C. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 169 (2008), http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/iclr/vol31/
iss1/9
169 
JAPANESE RICE PROTECTIONISM: A 
CHALLENGE FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF 
AGRICULTURAL TRADE LAWS 
Chandler H. Udo* 
Abstract: The Japanese government has failed to contribute meaningfully 
to agricultural trade negotiations. Japan’s extreme negotiation posture 
primarily stems from a disinclination to make concessions in its domestic 
rice market. It is also a result of the ability of Japan, and other developed 
nations, to take advantage of the rule structure outlined by the Agree-
ment on Agriculture. Under current agricultural laws, Japan is able to 
maintain many domestic measures that provide support for rice farmers 
while also charging prohibitively high tariffs. Japan’s reluctance to limit its 
support for domestic rice farmers is based on the premise that rice plays a 
central role in Japanese culture, and without protection, the industry 
would collapse. What Japan has failed to realize, however, is that the bases 
of its arguments have little merit today. Perhaps more importantly, Japa-
nese resistance to agricultural trade reform seriously undermines the le-
gitimacy of the WTO. 
Introduction 
 On July 24, 2006, the World Trade Organization’s (WTO) Direc-
tor-General, Pascal Lamy, announced that trade negotiations would 
be suspended primarily because of a failure to reach an agreement on 
agriculture.1 The United States and the European Union (EU) are 
generally attributed much of the blame for the impasse because of 
their perceived hard-line positions on agricultural protectionism.2 
This allocation of responsibility is not a surprise considering that the 
U.S. and EU agendas generally drive the negotiating process forward.3 
                                                                                                                      
* Chandler H. Udo is a Note Editor for the Boston College International & Comparative 
Law Review. 
1 Pascal Lamy, Director-General, World Trade Org., Informal Trade Negotiations Com-
mittee Meeting: Chairman’s Introductory Remarks ( July 24, 2006), available at http://www. 
wto.org/english/news_e/news06_e/mod06_summary_24july_e.htm. 
2 See Cody Thacker, Note, Agricultural Trade Liberalization in the Doha Round: The Search 
for a Modalities Draft, 33 Ga. J. Int’l & Comp. L. 721, 739 (2005). 
3 Fatoumata Jawara & Aileen Kwa, Behind the Scenes at the WTO: The Real 
World of International Trade Negotiations 50 (2003). 
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Given this situation, it is easy to overlook the fact that Japan has failed 
to play a positive role in agricultural negotiations because of a reluc-
tance to make concessions in its domestic rice market.4 
 During an interview at the WTO’s round of negotiations in Can-
cun, Mexico, a western diplomat was quoted as saying, “Japanese rice 
is seen as an icon of cultural protectionism around the world.”5 This 
comment reflects a fundamental frustration in the way that many 
countries view Japan’s disinclination to reduce its enormous rice sup-
port measures.6 In fact, Japanese rice farmers receive approximately 
$2.8 billion dollars in domestic government assistance annually.7 The 
Japanese government’s intervention, from a global perspective, is 
“unprecedented in its degree.”8 
 The delicate balance of agricultural protectionism and the 
WTO’s stated goal to “ensure that trade flows as smoothly, predictably 
and freely as possible” have coexisted since the creation of the WTO 
in 1994.9 In fact, the agreement reached in 1994 is credited with “hav-
ing taken the first and most important steps forward in the process of 
integrating agriculture into the mainstream of rules in the interna-
tional trading system.”10 The 1994 agreement was certainly not a per-
fect resolution, and many countries were dissatisfied with its provi-
sions throughout the negotiating process.11 Perhaps this tension can 
be explained by the negative political implications of agricultural re-
                                                                                                                      
4 See Yujiro Hayami & Yoshihisa Godo, Economics and Politics of Rice Policy in Japan: A Per-
spective of the Uruguay Round 1 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 5431, 
1995). 
5 WTO on a Sticky Wicket Against Japanese Rice Farmers, The Age, Sept. 12, 2003, available 
at http://www.theage.com.au/articles/2003/09/11/1063268512176.html. 
6 See id. 
7 U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Rice Sector Policies in Japan 4 (2003) [hereinafter Rice 
Sector Policies]. 
8 Emiko Ohnuki-Tierney, Rice as Self: Japanese Identities Through Time 15 
(1993). 
9 World Trade Org., WTO in Brief, http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/ 
inbrief_e/inbr00_e.htm (last visited Jan. 26, 2006); see, e.g., World Trade Org., The Re-
sults of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations: The Legal 
Texts 39–68 (1995) [hereinafter Results]. 
10 See Melaku Geboye Desta, Agriculture and the Doha Development Agenda: Any Hopes for 
Improvement?, in Essays on the Future of the WTO 149, 150 (Kim Van der Borght et al. 
eds., 2003). 
11 See Kern Alexander, The World Trade Organization: A Very Short Introduction by Amrita 
Narlikar, 55 Int’l & Comp.L.Q. 780, 782 (2006). 
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form.12 In any event, agriculture remains a vitally important issue in 
international trade.13 
 Part I of this Note summarizes the development of agricultural 
trade agreements and Japan’s reasons for resisting reduction of their 
current protectionist polices on rice. Part II explores some of the provi-
sions of the 1994 Agreement on Agriculture (AoA), the exceptions Ja-
pan has used to avoid its obligations within the AoA, and Japan’s do-
mestic rice policies. Part III focuses on potential revisions to the AoA 
and offers reasons why Japan should change its current negotiating po-
sition. 
I. Background 
 The rules governing the international trading system were origi-
nally codified in the 1947 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT).14 This multilateral treaty sought to create a system that estab-
lished core principles in international trade.15 A series of successive 
rounds of trade negotiations followed, focusing on the reform of im-
port tariffs and quotas.16 These negotiations, however, had limited par-
ticipation and avoided significant agricultural reform.17 The Uruguay 
Round of negotiations, which lasted from 1986–1994, was the first to 
adopt a comprehensive set of reform measures in international trade 
since the inception of the GATT.18 Arguably the most important result 
of this historic event was the Marrakesh agreement creating the WTO.19 
 The AoA, contained within the Marrakesh agreement, focused 
on achieving binding commitments in multiple areas, including pro-
moting market access and limiting domestic support.20 The combina-
tion of market access restrictions and domestic support measures was 
considered to distort the free trade of agricultural goods.21 While rec-
                                                                                                                      
12 See Wyn Grant, The Politics of Agricultural Trade, in Agriculture and International 
Trade Law, Policy and the WTO 49, 49 (Michael Cardwell et al. eds., 2003) [hereinafter 
Agriculture and International Trade Law]. 
13 See id. 
14 Jawara & Kwa, supra note 3, at 5. 
15 See id. at 7. 
16 See id. at 8. 
17 See id. 
18 See id. 
19 See Jawara & Kwa, supra note 3, at 9. 
20 See Results, supra note 9, at 39. 
21 See id. 
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ognized as a significant step, the conclusion of the AoA was but one 
stage in the process of trade reform.22 
 Although many countries considered the AoA to be a significant 
accomplishment, developing countries have viewed it as one of the 
most inequitable agreements in the WTO.23 In effect, the AoA pro-
vides preferential treatment for developed countries that use their 
superior bargaining power to push their own agendas.24 The most de-
veloped countries in the world successfully incorporated “loopholes” 
into the agreement that significantly reduced its potential impact on 
international trade reform.25 One such loophole is the “green box” 
measures that allow countries to classify broad swaths of agricultural 
support as having no trade distorting effects, when they in fact impact 
trade significantly.26 
 In signing the AoA, developed countries were interested in pro-
ducing a carefully designed agreement that would minimize the num-
ber of changes required in their overall agricultural support policies.27 
In these developed nations, farmers are highly reliant on subsidies, tar-
iffs, and other support measures.28 Thus, these farm interests lobby vig-
orously for the maintenance of government support.29 Therefore, 
loopholes such as the “green box” measures allow developed countries 
to satisfy their agricultural industry while appearing to support global 
trade.30 
 On the other hand, developing nations were primarily concerned 
with fair competition that allows them to gain access to developed 
countries’ markets, and prevent cheaper subsidized goods from enter-
ing their own countries.31 Under the current system, farmers in devel-
oping nations “cannot compete and go out of business” with the influx 
of foreign goods, often destroying overall agricultural production.32 In 
particular, agricultural subsidies in developed countries lead to over-
production of certain agricultural goods on the world market, thereby 
                                                                                                                      
22 Christopher Rodgers & Michael Cardwell, The WTO, International Trade and Agricul-
tural Policy Reform, in Agriculture and International Trade Law, supra note 12, 1. 
23 Jawara & Kwa, supra note 3, at 26. 
24 See id. at 50. 
25 Id. at 27. 
26 See id. 
27 See id. 
28 See Grant, supra note 12, at 49. 
29 Id. at 50. 
30 See id. 
31 See Jawara & Kwa, supra note 3, at 29. 
32 See id. 
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depressing prices.33 Thus, given this situation, developing nations were 
in favor of eliminating subsidies and promoting market access.34 
  The most recent round of multilateral negotiations began in 
Doha, Qatar in 2001 with a comprehensive set of goals.35 To date, no 
agreement has been reached because of a stark contrast in the posi-
tions of the participants.36 Most developing countries came to the ne-
gotiating table unwilling to support further agricultural trade reform, 
but preferred to focus on implementation of issues from the previous 
round.37 Developed countries, on the other hand, have continued to 
cling to arguments relating to food supply, stable farm income, politi-
cal influence and cultural values to justify giving agriculture special 
treatment.38 Two of these arguments have particular significance in 
the case of Japanese rice: (1) culture and (2) self-sufficiency. 
A. Culture 
 Domestically produced rice has occupied a central place in Japa-
nese culture for centuries.39 Although rice might not be considered 
“the staple food” of the Japanese diet since its introduction to Japan, 
it has maintained crucial symbolic significance.40 Of all grains, rice 
alone was believed to have a soul and it alone required ritual per-
formances.41 Core imperial rituals in ancient Japan were officiated by 
the emperor and all related to rice harvesting.42 In addition, rice has 
had significance in issues of wealth, power, and aesthetics.43 Most citi-
zens in contemporary Japan would not claim that rice has a soul or is 
a deity, but its significance in Japanese history is still recognized.44 A 
statement made by a Japanese agricultural union embodied this be-
lief: “[r]ice farming in Japan, with a history of 2300 years behind it, 
has greatly influenced all areas of national life, including social order 
                                                                                                                      
33 See id. at 27. 
34 See id. 
35 See Thacker, supra note 2, at 722. 
36 See Jawara & Kwa, supra note 3, at 53–56. 
37 See id. at 54. 
38 Margaret Rosso Grossman, The Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture and Domestic 
Support, in Agriculture and International Trade Law, supra note 12, 27, 29. 
39 See Ohnuki-Tierney, supra note 8, at 109. 
40 See id. at 4. 
41 Id. at 44. 
42 See id. at 46. 
43 See id. at 63. 
44 See Ohnuki-Tierney, supra note 8, at 108. 
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[and] religious worship . . . thus molding the prototype of Japanese 
culture.”45 
 Japanese citizens insist that locally grown short-grain rice is supe-
rior to the long-grain version grown in places such as California and 
Southeast Asia.46 Many Japanese cite the widespread use of chemicals 
and pesticides as evidence of the impurity of California rice.47 Thus, 
there has traditionally been a great deal of domestic tolerance for the 
artificially high price of rice within Japan.48 As one commentator has 
noted, “Despite the massive transfer of funds from consumer to rice 
producer, there has not been a serious consumer movement in Japan 
to force the removal of rice subsidies.”49 
B. Self-Sufficiency 
 Japanese statesmen have consistently advanced the argument that 
rice protectionist measures are necessary to ensure that Japan can 
feed its own population.50 A prevailing view is that Japan should re-
main self-sufficient in the production of rice because it plays such an 
important role in the Japanese diet.51 The Japanese also emphasize 
the necessity of rice subsidies by claiming that their domestic rice in-
dustry is on the verge of collapsing in spite of governmental sup-
port.52 Japan’s shrinking rural population and aging farmers exacer-
bate the problem.53 In contemporary Japan, the older generation 
farms rice part-time while the younger generation primarily works in 
Japanese cities.54 
 Japan has asserted that food security is one of the most serious 
concerns among Japanese consumers because it is the largest net-
importer of food in the world.55 Given this situation, Japan claims, 
                                                                                                                      
45 See id. at 109. 
46 See id. at 110. Japonica rice, or short grain type, has shorter, rounder, more translu-
cent grains than long-grain rice and becomes sticky when cooked. See id. at 13. 
47 See id. at 110. 
48 See id. at 22. 
49 Peter Jegi Gordon, Rice Policy of Japan’s LDP: Domestic Trends Toward Agreement, 30 
Asian Surv. 943, 951 (1990). 
50 See, e.g., Min. of Agric., Forestry, & Fisheries, Negotiating Proposal by Japan on WTO Agri-
cultural Negotiations, available at http://www.maff.go.jp/wto/wto_nihon_teian_e.htm [herein-
after Negotiating Proposal]. 
51 Gordon, supra note 49, at 951. 
52 See Duncan Bartlett, Japan Fights to Protect Rice Farming, BBC World News, Apr. 17, 
2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/4907742.stm. 
53 See Ohnuki-Tierney, supra note 8, at 17. 
54 See id. 
55 See Negotiating Proposal, supra note 50. 
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“[W]e should gain as much food as possible that one can produce in 
one’s country, giving thanks to the blessing of the earth.”56 Further-
more, Japan has continued to emphasize the importance of securing a 
stable food supply in their WTO negotiating proposals.57 
 The weight of this argument has lessened as an influx of foreign 
dishes has consistently diminished the demand for rice.58 In 1990, rice 
production could have far exceeded consumption if all agricultural 
land was used for rice cultivation.59 
II. Discussion 
 The AoA embodied the culmination of years of arduous negotia-
tions between multiple countries.60 Despite its perceived shortcom-
ings, the AoA established a comprehensive legal framework to pro-
mote the liberalization61 of agricultural trade.62 The AoA begins by 
stating, “[The parties’] long-term objective . . . is to establish a fair 
and market-oriented agricultural trading system and that a reform 
process should be initiated through the negotiation of commitments 
on support . . . .”63 In order to achieve this objective, members agreed 
to binding commitments in market access, export competition, and 
domestic support.64 These commitments were not absolute and took 
into consideration non-trade concerns such as food security and envi-
ronmental protection.65 In addition, members recognized “that trade 
reform was an ongoing process” and agreed that negotiations for con-
tinued agricultural reform would begin in 2000.66 
 The scope of the AoA was unique in that it recognized domestic 
policies should be regulated in addition to policies governing interna-
tional trade such as tariffs and quotas.67 The members signing the 
agreement were aware that domestic agricultural policies are closely 
                                                                                                                      
56 See Min. of Agric., Forestry, & Fisheries, Food Security, http://www.maff.go.jp/soshiki/ 
kambou/joutai/onepoint/public/ta_8e.html (last visited on Jan. 25, 2008). 
57 See Negotiating Proposal, supra note 50. 
58 See Ohnuki-Tierney, supra note 8, at 16. 
59 See id. 
60 See Rodgers & Cardwell, supra note 22, at 3. 
61 Results, supra note 9. The concept of liberalization refers to reductions in domestic 
subsidies and protectionist measures such as tariffs in order to create a system that con-
forms more closely with market forces. See Grossman, supra note 38, at 30. 
62 See Rodgers & Cardwell, supra note 22, at 1. 
63 Results, supra note 9, at 39. 
64 Id. 
65 Grossman, supra note 38, at 30. 
66 Id. at 31. 
67 See id. at 33. 
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linked to international trade.68 Thus, the AoA covered both border 
measures and domestic policies.69 Border measures refer to the set of 
policies which are crafted to specifically target trade flows and prices 
by the use of import quotas and tariffs.70 “Domestic support policies 
include all other agricultural measures within a country that aim to 
influence farm incomes, resource use, production, consumption, or 
environmental impacts.”71 
 Under the AoA, domestic agricultural support is divided into two 
categories: those that distort trade and those that do not.72 By moving 
domestic agricultural support to categories exempt from reduction, 
WTO members have successfully met their reduction commitments 
without actually reducing overall domestic support.73 
A. The Agreement on Agriculture: Provisions 
 The AoA provides different rule structures for different types of 
domestic agricultural support.74 Domestic measures are generally classi-
fied within “boxes.”75 As described by one scholar, “The ‘amber box’ 
contains policies that are trade distorting and are subject to reduction; 
the ‘green box’ contains policies that have a minimal effect on trade; 
and the ‘blue box’ provides for an exemption for payments that would 
otherwise fit within the ‘amber box.’”76 Amber box support measures 
are reported within each country’s “Aggregate Measurement of Sup-
port” (AMS), which is defined in article (1)(a).77 Beginning in 1999, 
Japan has consistently met its obligation under the AoA by reporting an 
AMS of zero.78 This result is misleading because Japan continues to 
subsidize its domestic rice market by classifying many support policies 
                                                                                                                      
68 See id. 
69 Betina Demaranan et al., OECD Domestic Support and Developing Countries, in The 
WTO, Developing Countries and the Doha Development Agenda 63, 63 (Basudeb 
Guha-Kasnobis ed., 2004) [hereinafter Doha Development Agenda]. 
70 See Grossman, supra note 38, at 33. 
71 Id. at 33. 
72 See id. at 34. 
73 See id. at 33. 
74 See id. at 34. 
75 Grossman, supra note 38, at 34. 
76 Id. 
77 See Results, supra note 9, at 40. Aggregate Measurement of Support and “AMS” re-
fer to the annual level of support, expressed in monetary terms, provided for an agricul-
tural product in favor of the producers in general, other that the support provided under 
the programmes that qualify as exempt from reduction under Annex 2. See id. 
78 See Rice Sector Policies, supra note 7, at 11. 
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as non-trade distorting “green box” measures.79 Japan also protects its 
domestic rice industry by erecting substantial tariff barriers for im-
ported rice contrary to the AoA’s stated objectives.80 
1. The Green Box 
 A country may avoid reporting its domestic agricultural support 
under the AMS by classifying it as a “green box” measure.81 There are 
numerous exemptions allowed as long as they meet the requirements 
of Annex 2 of the agreement.82 According to Annex 2(1): “[d]omestic 
support measures for which exemption from the reduction commit-
ments is claimed shall meet the fundamental requirement that they 
have no, or at least minimal, trade distorting effects on production.”83 
Under Annex 2, a country may provide domestic subsidies for: food 
security, domestic food aid, environmental preservation, research, pest 
control, structural adjustment assistance, and many other reasons.84 As 
long as Japan meets the requirements set out in Annex 2, it is free to 
classify broad swaths of domestic agricultural support as trade-neutral 
“green box” measures.85 
 One “green box” policy that Japan employs is rice paddy diver-
sion payments.86 Rice farmers are offered payments if they use their 
land for purposes other than growing rice.87 Although Japan’s main 
purpose in enacting this policy is to reduce supply, it is reported as a 
“green box” measure based on preservation of the land in an envi-
ronmentally useful condition.88 Japan also classifies payments for re-
lief during natural disasters, land consolidation, and interest conces-
sions for agricultural loans as “green box” measures.89 Although these 
measures are justified under Annex 2 of the AoA, they serve to subsi-
dize Japanese farmers.90 This reveals a basic flaw with the “green box” 
in general: countries are able to continue to manipulate their domes-
                                                                                                                      
79 See id. at 6. 
80 See Results, supra note 9, at 39; WTO on a Sticky Wicket Against Japan’s Rice Bowlers, 
supra note 5. 
81 See Results, supra note 9, at 40. 
82 See id. at 56–62. 
83 Id. at 56. 
84 See id. at 56–62. 
85 See Desta, supra, note 10, at 177. 
86 See Rice Sector Policies, supra note 7, at 6. 
87 See id. at 5, 7. 
88 See id. at 7. 
89 See id. 
90 See id. 
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tic agriculture market through direct payments and disguised finan-
cial transfers.91 Furthermore, most economists agree that no domestic 
support can ever be trade-neutral.92 
2. Market Access 
 The AoA took significant strides in promoting market access by 
limiting ways that countries can protect their agricultural producers 
from foreign competition.93 According to articles 4, 5 and Annex 5, 
countries are prohibited from assessing non-tariff barriers to trade in 
agricultural products.94 The AoA requires that member countries 
convert preexisting non-tariff barriers into tariffs through a process 
known as “tariffication.”95 The AoA then called for tariffs to be re-
duced by an average of thirty-six percent worldwide during the course 
of a six year implementation period.96 This process was left at the dis-
cretion of member nations and many tariffs remain substantial.97 
 Japan, like other developed countries, has continued to maintain 
incredibly high tariffs in particular agricultural sectors.98 For instance, 
Japan’s tariffs for rice remain around five times the overall price of 
rice.99 Under the AoA, Japan is required to import a certain amount of 
foreign rice each year under what is known as the Tariff Rate Quota 
(TRQ).100 In 2001, Japan’s import quota for rice and rice products was 
682,000 tons.101 Within this quota, rice imports are not subject to tar-
iffs.102 Any amount outside of the quota was assessed a tariff of 
$2819/ton in 2001.103 This prohibitively high amount essentially elimi-
nated the possibility that foreign rice would enter the Japanese mar-
ket.104 Furthermore, a large percentage of imported rice within the 
TRQ is not sold within Japan’s domestic market, as the AoA intended, 
                                                                                                                      
91 See Rice Sector Policies, supra note 7, at 6. 
92 See Desta, supra note 10, at 177. 
93 Id. 
94 See Results, supra note 9, at 42–45, 65–68. 
95 See Desta, supra note 10, at 156. 
96 See id. 
97 See id. 
98 See Rice Sector Policies, supra note 7, at 13. 
99 See WTO on a Sticky Wicket Against Japan’s Rice Bowlers, supra note 5. 
100 See Rice Sector Policies, supra note 7, at 12. 
101 See id. 
102 Id. 
103 Id. 
104 See id. 
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but is donated as food aid.105 Thus, Japanese rice farmers are shielded 
from all foreign competition.106 
B. Japanese Domestic Laws 
 The legal foundation for Japan’s domestic agricultural policies was 
originally codified in the 1961 Basic Law on Food, Agriculture and Ru-
ral Areas (Basic Law).107 The Basic Law specifically sought to promote 
agricultural productivity and provide income support for Japanese 
farmers.108 
 The stated objective of the Basic Law is found in article 1: “[t]he 
objective of this law is to improve people’s lifestyle and to develop the 
natural economy through comprehensively and systematically imple-
menting policies on food . . . by means of establishing basic principles 
and basic matters for realizing them . . . .”109 The Basic law gives broad 
authority to the government to manage the Japanese agricultural in-
dustry through environmental measures, direct subsidies, and pay-
ments during times of emergencies.110 The driving force behind the 
Basic Law was to address the substantial difference in income between 
agriculture and industry.111 The Japanese government was expected to 
control agricultural markets in order to guarantee that farmers could 
make an income similar to those employed in other industries and to 
provide an incentive for them to remain in the agricultural sector.112 
 Under the new rules set out in the AoA, Japan instituted the Law 
for Stabilization of Supply-Demand and Price of Staple Food (Staple 
Food Law).113 This law still allows the Japanese government to ensure 
the stabilization of supply, demand, and the price of rice.114 One ma-
jor change initiated by the Staple Food Law was the increased deregu-
lation of the distribution of rice.115 The government no longer re-
                                                                                                                      
105 See Rice Sector Policies, supra note 7, at 2–3. 
106 See id. 
107 See Basic Law on Food, Agriculture, and Rural Areas, available at http://www.maff. 
go.jp/soshiki/kambou/kikaku/NewBLaw/BasicLaw.html [hereinafter Basic Law] (last 
visited Jan. 25, 2008). 
108 See James R. Moore, Unlocking the Japanese Rice Market: How Far Will the Door Be 
Opened?, 9 Transnat’l. Law. 273, 274 (1996). 
109 See Basic Law, supra note 107. 
110 See id. 
111 See Moore, supra note 108, at 279. 
112 Id. 
113 See id. at 287. 
114 Id. at 288. 
115 See id. 
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quires rice farmers to sell their rice directly to the government but 
allows them in certain cases to sell rice to registered shippers.116 The 
Minister of Agriculture determines the government purchase price of 
rice by taking into account production conditions, commodity prices, 
and rice sold on the free market.117 This system allows the Japanese 
government to partially deregulate the rice market while still guaran-
teeing that rice farmers receive a fair price.118 
III. Analysis 
 Any future changes in the WTO rule structure will necessarily 
require unanimous agreement of all member nations.119 This consen-
sus is exceedingly difficult to achieve when there are well over a hun-
dred ministers present at the negotiating table with conflicting inter-
ests and agendas.120 The highly politicized issue of agriculture 
compounds the problem of consensus-building.121 Despite these diffi-
culties, Japan’s ability to circumvent its obligations through the “green 
box” and tariff loopholes is overwhelming evidence of a need for 
change.122 In order to address these deficiencies, the loopholes built 
into the AoA will have to be limited or eliminated.123 This will require 
Japan to be more conciliatory in its negotiating position by asserting a 
willingness to consider reducing its rice protectionist measures.124 
 There are currently no limits on the amount of subsidies that can 
fall within the “green box.”125 In fact, between 1986 and 1995, “green 
box” support measures increased by fifty-four percent worldwide.126 
One commentator notes that various proposals have been presented 
to amend the “green box” including: (1) abolish the box alto-
gether; (2) place a cap on the amount of money that can be spent 
within the box; and (3) narrow the scope of the measures covered.127 
It is unlikely that the box will be eliminated altogether considering 
that it serves important goals such as improving sustainable agricul-
                                                                                                                      
116 See Moore, supra note 108, at 288. 
117 See id. at 289. 
118 See id. 
119 See Jawara & Kwa, supra note 3, at 50. 
120 See id. 
121 See Grant, supra note 12, at 49. 
122 See, e.g., Rice Sector Policies, supra note 7. 
123 See id. 
124 See Negotiating Proposal, supra note 50. 
125 See Grossman, supra note 38, at 39. 
126 See id. 
127 Desta, supra note 10, at 177. 
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ture and supporting rural development.128 In addition, the European 
Union and Japan have been opposed to the imposition of a cap on 
“green box” expenditures.129 Thus, as one commentator notes, “[T]he 
most important issue is whether the exemptions should be tight-
ened.”130 
 The most logical approach for tightening the “green box” would 
be to minimize the near exhaustive list of exceptions left to the judg-
ment of individual nations.131 For example, Japan pays rice farmers 
diversion payments when they use part of their land for growing crops 
other than rice.132 These payments are justified by the preservation of 
Japan’s paddies in an environmentally useful condition.133 In effect, 
this provides Japanese rice farmers with a subsidy while allowing the 
Japanese government to control the supply of rice.134 Thus, the 
“green box” should be restructured to limit the ability of governments 
to justify domestic support by resorting to the “green box.”135 
 Any future changes to the market access provisions of the AoA 
will be concerned with the extent of tariff reduction and the process 
used to achieve the reduction targets.136 The European Union has rec-
ommended a similar approach to that taken in the Uruguay Round of 
negotiations, which called for a thirty-six percent reduction per tar-
iff.137 The United States even went so far as to suggest that the parties 
set a date for the eventual elimination of all tariffs.138 Japan has been 
much more cautious in its approach.139 It has stated that, “[I]t is es-
sential that an appropriate tariff level be determined, considering the 
situation surrounding each product and the negotiating history, 
thereby providing flexibility for each product.”140 Given this negotiat-
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ing posture, it is reasonable to infer that Japan is unwilling to allow 
rice tariffs to become subject to major reduction.141 
 It is in Japan’s best interest to rethink this strategy by allowing 
rice to become part of the market access dialogue.142 Once Japan 
abandons the notion that rice is exempt from tariff reduction, it can 
gradually become integrated into a long term reform process.143 One 
can argue that Japan’s domestic rice producers would be able to sur-
vive tariff reductions by carefully considering the initial tariff rates 
and controlling the speed of their reduction.144 The case of Japanese 
beef is illustrative.145 Japanese beef became subject to tarrification as a 
result of bilateral United States-Japanese negotiations in 1991.146 This 
agreement did not result in rapid importation of beef, as many people 
fear will happen in the case of rice, but rather beef imports decreased 
overall compared to previous years.147 Additionally, domestic beef pro-
duction remained stable.148 Thus, the process of tarrification of rice, 
as mandated by the AoA, could have similar results in the case of 
Japanese rice.149 
 Notwithstanding the cultural significance of rice in Japanese his-
tory, there is evidence to suggest that Japanese consumers are becom-
ing increasingly ambivalent toward its cultural role.150 Japan’s formal 
trade policy appears to presuppose that the Japanese citizenry is 
starkly opposed to an open market for their rice.151 Even before the 
signing of the original AoA, however, there were indications that 
Japanese citizens no longer support a hard-line approach toward rice 
protectionism.152 A poll conducted by a major Japanese newspaper in 
April of 1990, found that public support for partial liberalization of 
the rice market was up to sixty-five percent; while twenty-one percent 
favored full liberalization, only thirty percent thought Conversely, 
                                                                                                                      
141 See id. 
142 See id. 
143 See id. 
144 See Hayami & Godo, supra note 4, at 7. 
145 See id. 
146 See id. 
147 See id. at 5, 7. Over five years that quotas were in effect, beef imports grew at a rate 
of approximately twenty-percent while the annual growth rate averaged under thirteen-
percent during the four years after tarrification. See id. at 7. 
148 See id. at 7. 
149 See Hayami & Godo, supra note 4, at 7. 
150 See Gordon, supra note 49, at 949. 
151 See Negotiating Proposal, supra note 50 (arguing that the international community 
should respect each country’s values and cultural backgrounds). 
152 See Gordon, supra note 49, at 952. 
2008] Japanese Rice Protectionism 183 
land titling programs would unlock more capital than can be given in 
foreign aid, empower the poor, and reinforce democratic participa-
tion the rice market should maintain the same level of protection.153 
 Japan should also consider that their current position on rice 
protectionism could imperil agreements on non-agricultural issues.154 
Market access of non-agricultural products is often referred to as “the 
core business” of the WTO, since the original tariff negotiations form-
ing the basis of the GATT were on non-agricultural products.155 Addi-
tionally, agriculture has significantly declined as an economic industry 
in developed countries.156 Thus, with the declining significance of ag-
riculture, and the wide range of non-agricultural issues the WTO ad-
dresses, it is difficult to justify the fact that agriculture remains one of 
the main issues dividing countries.157 Yet, ironically, the failure to 
reach an agreement on agriculture has been the main reason for the 
overall failure of recent WTO negotiations.158 
 Japan can make significant progress in reaching an agreement on 
their overall trade goals by recognizing that their rice protectionist 
policies cripple the negotiating process.159 Indeed, it will be necessary 
for both the European Union and the United States to offer similar 
concessions for a new agreement to be successful.160 Both have pre-
sented agricultural proposals that are much more conciliatory than 
Japan’s.161 In order for Japan to endorse these proposals, it will have 
to be both willing to initiate broad reforms in its domestic rice poli-
cies and subject imported rice to meaningful tariff reduction.162 
Conclusion 
 The future legitimacy of the WTO may rest on the ability of the 
member nations to reach a new agreement on agriculture. Japan’s rice 
protectionist measures have, in large part, driven it away from the ne-
gotiating table and thwarted a possible resolution to agricultural re-
form. The foregoing analysis has shown how multilateral negotiations 
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involving multiple issues and parties are difficult processes. Nonethe-
less, there is a great deal of potential for significant changes to be made 
in the current AoA in terms of domestic support and market access. 
Japan’s protectionist rice policies no longer have the cultural signifi-
cance they once did and subjecting the rice market to external compe-
tition would be unlikely to destroy domestic Japanese rice production. 
Finally, it will be important for Japan to consider that their hard-line 
position on rice protectionism could seriously undermine the entire 
process of trade reform for both agricultural and non-agricultural 
products. 
